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Abstract.
Examples of repeated destructive behavior abound throughout the
history of human societies. This paper examines the role of social memory — a society’s
vicarious beliefs about the past — in creating and perpetuating destructive conflicts.
We examine whether such behavior is consistent with the theory of rational strategic
behavior.
We analyze an infinite-horizon model in which two countries face off each period in
an extended Prisoner’s Dilemma game in which an additional possibility of mutually
destructive “all out war” yields catastrophic consequence for both sides. Each country
is inhabited by a dynastic sequence of individuals who care about future individuals in
the same country, and can communicate with the next generation of their countrymen
using private messages. The two countries’ actions in each period also produce physical
evidence; a sequence of informative but imperfect public signals that can be observed
by all current and future individuals.
We find that, provided the future is sufficiently important for all individuals, regardless of the precision of physical evidence from the past there is an equilibrium of the
model in which the two countries’ social memory is systematically wrong, and in which
the two countries engage in all out war with arbitrarily high frequency.
Surprisingly, we find that degrading the quality of information that individuals have
about current decisions may “improve” social memory so that it can no longer be systematically wrong. This in turn ensures that arbitrarily frequent all out wars cannot
take place.
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Introduction

Between February 21 and December 19 of 1916, the French and German armies clashed near
the French city of Verdun. The French suffered 378,000 casualties of whom 120,000 dead. The
Germans suffered 337,000 casualties of whom 100,000 dead. The final positions of the French
and German armies on December 19 were no more than a few kilometers away from what
they were on February 21, with no major population center having gone from the control of
one side to the other.
This and many other bloody pages of European history seem even more paradoxical and
pointless viewed from the later perspective of March 25, 1957, when France and (West)
Germany, together with four other European countries (Italy, Belgium, The Netherlands and
Luxembourg) signed the Treaty of Rome, establishing what was later to become the European
Union.
Further conflict between major European powers now seems unimaginable. However, for
many centuries the end of one conflict in Europe clearly did not make future ones any less
likely. In some cases one conflict sowed the seeds for one to follow. How could the same
societies that endured the battle of Verdun and many other mass slaughters of World War
I clash again, on an even grander scale, barely 20 years later? How could the memory of
one conflict not stop the next one from igniting? Generations of scholars have struggled with
these questions.
In this paper, we carry out a parallel exercise to the detailed and specialized understanding
that historians provide. Using the tools of game theory as a supplement to the historian’s
perspective, we examine the role of memory in creating and perpetuating destructive behavior
on a large scale.
Imagine that we strip from the analysis the political layers within each society that may
give positive incentives for conflict, for instance because one social stratum stands to gain from
what is an overall destructive conflict with another society. Consider then a situation in which
all out conflict is catastrophically bad for all involved in a way that everyone understands.
Suppose also that we endow the actors with unlimited capacity for strategic thinking and
data analysis. Is it then the case that all these “optimistic hypotheticals” rule out histories
with the equivalent of the battle of Verdun and World War II starting 23 years later? In
this paper, we establish that the answer is in fact “no.” The basic mechanism that sustains
disastrous outcomes under our optimistic hypotheticals revolves around the possibility that
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a society’s memory may be far from accurate, even in the presence of compelling physical
evidence from the past.
It is no surprise that memory matters. Yet, in many instances, the way in which a society
remembers its past influences its decisions in the present, sometimes in profoundly disturbing
ways. Consider just two examples:
“In 1989, the Serbs commemorated their defeat at the hands of the Turks in the
Battle of Blackbird Field, in 1389, and it formed the starting point for the Balkans
wars of the 1990s.”

—

Baumeister and Hastings (1997).

“You know the Spanish crusade against Muslims and the expulsions from Al Andalus [in 1492] are not so long ago.”

—

Al Qaeda spokesman (after claiming

responsibility for the 2004 Madrid bombing).1
In these instances, horrific outcomes were seemingly shaped by oral or written accounts
passed on through generations. Social scientists in anthropology, psychology, and distributed
cognition study these phenomena which they refer to as social memory. A small sample
of this large literature includes Cattell and Climo (2002), Connerton (1989), Fentress and
Wickham (1992), Pennebaker, Paez, and Rimè (1997), Rogers (1997) and Sutton (2005).
The literature identifies a number of specific features that define social memory. According
to Carole Crumley,
“Social memory is the means by which information is transmitted among individuals and groups and from one generation to another. Not necessarily aware
that they are doing so, individuals pass on their behaviors and attitudes to others in various contexts but especially through emotional and practical ties and in
relationships among generations [...]”

—

Crumley (2002)

In our model, the practical ties and relationships among the generations are forged by
intergenerational communication within “dynasties.” These are placeholders for individual
decision makers who are finitely lived but care about what happens to future generations who
inhabit the same dynasty. Families, tribes, ethnic groups, and nation states are all ongoing
entities with these features.
1

As quoted in Reston (2005, Prologue).
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Within each dynasty, each decision maker directly observes the current outcome then
chooses what and how much of this information to pass on to his successor in the dynasty.
Each new entrant has no direct memory of the past, but nevertheless forms a belief about it
from two possible sources. One is the message — the written or oral historiography of the
dynasty — received from his predecessor. Significantly, we assume that at least some part
of the communication within a dynasty is not publicly available to other dynasties.

The

other source is the physical evidence — history’s “footprint” — in the form of a sequence of
informative but imperfect public signals of events. It is impossible to reconstruct perfectly
past events once time has confounded the evidence.
Our results demonstrate the possibility that participants, even in the face of imperfect
but mounting evidence pointing to the truth, rely exclusively on the intra-dynastic messages
to gauge the best course of action. Weighing the various possible intentions and mistakes
that may generate their predecessors’ behavior, it is possible that the beliefs of the current
participants may stray very far from what is actually taking place. In other words, social
memory within and across societies can be systematically incorrect. Once this is granted,
catastrophic and perpetual all out conflicts may actually materialize in a variety of ways
provided everyone making decisions today is sufficiently concerned about the future.
To illustrate the mechanism by which this occurs, consider a world in which there are two
dynasties, in the form of two countries — F (France) and G (Germany). These countries
are engaged in a repeated Game of Conflict. In a Game of Conflict, there is at least one
“destructive” action profile which takes both countries below their “individually rational”
(minmax) payoff levels in the stage game. We refer to this profile as “all out war.” Notice
that if both countries had perfect memory of the past then all out war could not occur with
high frequency since, with perfect memory, long-run equilibrium payoffs must lie above the
stage game minmax.
We show that all out wars can start on the basis of a seemingly irrelevant “trigger.” In our
construction they start at pre-determined dates, but it is immediate to see that they could
also be brought about by some, possibly random, exogenous payoff irrelevant event. At this
point both sides plunge into destructive behavior because they believe it to be in the long
run interest of their country. But how can this be the case? Both sides realize that at some,
possibly distant, point in the future the slaughter will be over, and peace will prevail again.
The question in the mind of both sides is how good will peace be for them once it prevails.
Both sides think that peace-time will be a lot worse for them if they fail to wage war today.
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Since the future matters a lot for everyone this is sufficient to sustain a state of all out war.
This is so even if both sides can see that all out war will happen again, even very frequently.
Under our optimistic hypotheticals, the first difficulty comes once we look carefully at
what happens in the Game of Conflict during peaceful times. Peaceful times come in three,
very different, varieties. One that is good for both sides (“cooperation”), one that is bad
for one side and good for the other (“domination” by one country over the other), and a
third one in which the two sides are reversed. The idea is that if all sides have followed
the (war-mongering) precepts of the trigger then peaceful times will be good for both, but
otherwise they will be bad for the side that did not and good for the side that did. But
now suppose that country F did not follow the precepts and therefore peace just consists of
domination of F by G. If we are in a world with very frequent all out wars, soon a trigger
will dictate that both sides switch from (asymmetric) peace to all out war. But why should
F engage in such costly slaughter? After all, country F does not have anything more to lose
during peace times: these are already good for G and bad for F. This is where the possibility
of systematically incorrect social memory becomes critical. We demonstrate how country
F, relying on its own historiography (passed down from one generation to the next) rather
than on available evidence, suffers from the illusion that peace times are not asymmetrically
biased against it. If such illusion can be maintained for long enough in the face of mounting
evidence against it, then the circle can be closed, and a world with very frequent destructive
all out wars is compatible with the optimistic hypotheticals posited by the theory of rational
equilibrium behavior.
To summarize, we show that there exist equilibria in the Game of Conflict with the
following properties. (1) All out war occurs with arbitrarily high frequency. (2) Physical
evidence is ignored - i.e., neither beliefs nor actions condition on evidence from the past. (3)
In every history in which there is a deviation from equilibrium, social memory is incorrect
(from the point of view of at least one side); in fact, there are certain possible histories
after which social memory is maximally incorrect in the following sense. Using a standard
hypothesis testing procedure, and given any level of confidence, the null hypothesis that a
certain event took place is rejected by a statistician who observes the accumulated evidence.
However, all participants’ beliefs assign probability 1 to the very same event.
Our model behaves in a fundamentally different way from a standard repeated game with
infinitely-lived players. Crucially, messages can in principle convey more information than
any imperfect physical evidence. This is because they are sent after the current action profile
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is observed. It turns out that this is sufficient to make viable equilibria in which physical
evidence is ignored, but the messages convey the “wrong” information to future individuals.
To underscore this point, we examine a variation of the dynastic model in which information
is further degraded so that present actions of the rival country are not directly observed. All
dynastic members observe the same imperfect evidence about the rival. We show that, in any
pure strategy equilibrium, messages would be useless in this case, and so participants would
be forced to confront the evidence. The perpetual state of frequent all out war sketched above
therefore could not arise.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We review some related literature in Section 2, and then set up the model in Section 3. In Sections 4 and 5 we present our main
results. Section 6 concludes with a comparison of our work to other potential explanations
of destructive conflicts. For ease of exposition, some technical material has been relegated to
an Appendix.
2.

Relation to the Literature

Our framework can be compared to other models of endogenous “memory.” For example,
Bisin and Verdier (2001) propose a model of intergenerational transmission of cultural traits.
They examine a learning process in which imperfectly altruistic parents choose whether to
pass on certain cultural traits to their kids. A society with heterogeneous traits is shown
to emerge if parental and societal transmission mechanisms are substitutes. Their paper
belongs to a strand in the literature in which individuals’ memory is derived from tangible or
costly assets. The asset need not itself have value but can, nevertheless, effectively encode an
individual’s past behavior (Johnson, Levine, and Pesendorfer, 2001, Kandori, 1992b). Corbae,
Temzelides, and Wright (2003), Kocherlakota (1998), Kocherlakota and Wallace (1998) and
Wallace (2001) show how fiat money, for example, plays this role.
It is worth mentioning separately two papers in this strand that examine issues more
closely related to ours. Dessi (2005) studies the role of collective memory when individuals’
investment decisions exhibit spillovers. She models the problem of an informed principal
(the older generation) who selectively informs two younger agents about the value of a noisy
signal of the past. Negative or positive spillovers in the younger agents’ investments determine
whether or not the principal withholds some information. Glaeser (2005) models the political
economy of group hatred. In his model, “entrepreneurial” politicians can supply hate-creating
stories as a signal of an out-group’s threat to the rest of the uninformed citizenry. Verifying
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these stories is costly, and so a politician’s partially revealing (i.e., mixed) strategy leads the
citizens to put more weight in their beliefs on the truthfulness of these stories.
Our model differs from these in one critical respect. In our model a society’s history has
no direct effect on current payoffs. In game theoretic parlance, there are no payoff types.
While an individual’s private information affects his beliefs about past history, it does not
reflect any fundamentals. This distinction is not inconsequential. For instance, in Glaeser’s
model, there must be some states of the world, arising with positive probability, in which the
out-group really is dangerous in order for citizens to believe this even when the out-group
is, in fact, not dangerous. Our results show that the presence of payoff types is unnecessary:
destructive forces can be unleashed even when there is no objective danger to the current
generation in any state of the world.
The present model is also closely related to Anderlini and Lagunoff (2005), Kobayashi
(2003), Lagunoff and Matsui (2004), and to Anderlini, Gerardi, and Lagunoff (2006); the
latter also examines private communication in a dynastic game. But while these focus on
characterizing the broadest possible equilibrium set, the present paper concerns the creation
and consequences of social memory in such games. Crucially, these results do not apply to
the case of two dynasties and physical evidence from the past alongside private messages.
Our results also provide one coherent explanation for a number of unusual findings in lab
experiments designed to capture intergenerational environments. Chaudhuri, Schotter, and
Sopher (2001) and Schotter and Sopher (2001, 2003) show that word-of-mouth learning is a
stronger force for perpetuating conventions, good or bad, than simply having access to the
historical record. In related experiments, Duffy and Feltovich (2005) report that word-ofmouth communication frequently makes things worse than observing history alone. These
findings accord with our results, provided that subjects are never absolutely certain that the
historical evidence they receive is exact. Our results also help to explain the demonstrable
effect that private versus public communication has for sustaining bad outcomes found by
Chaudhuri, Schotter, and Sopher (2001).
A large strand of literature examines endogenous memory created by communication of
payoff-relevant signals. For this, we refer the reader to surveys on herding by Bikhchandani,
Hirshleifer, and Welch (1998) and Gale (1996), and recent work by Ahn and Suominen (2001),
Banerjee and Fudenberg (2004), Jackson and Kalai (1999) and Moscarini, Ottaviani, and
Smith (1998).
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The role of messages in games with infinitely-lived players and private monitoring is the
focus of Ben-Porath and Kahneman (1996), Compte (1998) and Kandori and Matsushima
(1998). Finally, a sizeable literature has been concerned with overlapping generation games
(Bhaskar, 1998, Kandori, 1992a, Salant, 1991, Smith, 1992, among others) in which participants have full memory and preferences do not encompass a dynastic component.
3.
3.1.

Model

A Game of Conflict

In each period two countries — France (F) and Germany (G) — face off in a stationary
environment. The class of stage games to which our analysis applies is broad.2 However, for
the sake of concreteness we work with the numerical example below throughout the paper.
C

D

W

C

2, 2

−1, 3

−25, 1

D

3, −1

0, 0

−8, −5

W

1, −25 −5, −8 −10, −10

(1)

If we restrict attention to the strategies C and D for both countries, the game in (1) is a
version of the Prisoners’ dilemma, with efficient payoffs reached when both sides “cooperate”
(play C), and a unique inefficient dominant strategy Nash equilibrium when both countries
“defect” (play D). The third strategy (W ) available to each country is interpreted as “war.”
Both countries choosing W is an “all out war.”
War is a dominated strategy for both players (as is C). If F and G were to face off
once only, neither could possibly choose W since D yields a higher payoff for every possible
strategy of the opponent. All out war pushes both sides below their individually rational
(minmax) payoffs; using the numbers in (1) these are both −8. War is a good way to punish
the other side, but it hurts the country that wages war. A country that chooses W gets a
higher payoff if the other cooperates. Its payoff decreases if the other side defects (“defends
itself”), and decreases further if the other side responds with war to war. Moreover, from a
2

For example, our results trivially extend to any 3 × 3 stage game with the same ordinal payoffs as in (1).
Our results also extend to a broader class of games, which we term “games of conflict.” This is composed of
all finite 2-player games in which each player has three strategies that correspond to C, D and W in (1) in
the following sense. If we restrict attention to the 9 combinations of these strategies (and ignore any others)
the payoffs have the same ordering as in (1).
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“utilitarian” point of view war is inefficient; the sum of payoffs if one or both sides choose W
is at most −13, while it is at least 0 if neither country chooses W .
It is critical to observe that if F and G were to face off indefinitely and were modeled as
standard long-run players with perfect recall, then we could be sure that “very frequent” all
out wars are ruled out. This is because as all out war occurs more and more frequently, the
long-run average payoff of both countries approaches −10. But both F and G can guarantee
a payoff of at least −8 in every period by unilaterally choosing D.
Our results are directly related to the possibility of a systematically incorrect social memory when the two countries face off repeatedly in a dynastic game. This is what we turn to
next.
3.2.

Dynastic Game

Each of our two countries F and G identifies a dynasty. A dynasty is a “placeholder” for
successive generations of individual decision makers. At any given time, the dynasty is
inhabited by one such decision maker who cares about his own payoff and those of future
generations within his own dynasty. The individuals who inhabit F and G in period t are
denoted by F t and G t respectively.3 The two countries’ per-period payoffs at t are denoted
by πFt and πGt respectively, and are as in (1).
In their general form the demographics of the model satisfy only one constraint. There is
a uniform upper bound L on the length of life of all individuals in all countries.4 Other than
this, the individuals in each country may be replaced at the same time or at different times,
the length of their lives in each or both countries may be constant or changing through time.
We refer to these as L-bounded demographics.
All individuals care not only about the per-period payoffs, but about the long-run future payoff of their country as well. Note that since each country is populated by separate
individuals through time, the degree by which future payoffs are taken into account can be
interpreted as the degree of “altruism” that individuals exhibit towards future individuals in
their own country. This is modeled using standard geometric weights, so that given a stream
3

Notice that at this point there is a redundancy in our notation. If the same person is alive, say, in F at
times t and t + 1, then F t and F t+1 identify the same individual. This will become convenient in Subsection
3.4 below.
4
The demographics we explicitly consider are deterministic. All our results extend easily to the case of
stochastic L-bounded demographics in which no individual lives for more than L periods with probability
one. This generalization involves no conceptual difficulties, but is very costly in notational terms.
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of per-period payoffs, the time t continuation payoffs to F t and G t , including both the present
and the future components can be written as
ΠtF = (1 − δ)

∞
X

δ τ −t πFτ

and

ΠtG = (1 − δ)

τ =t

∞
X

δ τ −t πGτ

(2)

τ =t

In the dynastic game what each individual observes about the past history of play when
he enters the game is critical. If the individuals F t and G t could only observe the actual
history from time t = 0, then the model would be equivalent to the standard repeated game
world of, say, Fudenberg and Maskin (1986);5 incorrect social memory would be ruled out by
assumption, and no frequent all out wars could take place.
When an individual (F t or G t , or both simultaneously) enters the game, he observes two
things: imperfect publicly available evidence of the past history of actions st , and a private
message about the previous history of actions from his predecessor, who was alive at t − 1
in his own country and whom he replaces. (The order in which these are observed, or if
they are observed simultaneously or not, does not matter.) Let these messages be mtF and
mtG respectively, depending on which individual(s) is replaced at t. All individuals alive at
t (regardless of when they entered the game) observe the opponent’s action at t when play
takes place, and afterwards the realization of st+1 . The evidence st is the footprint that the
history of actions taken up to t − 1 leaves for the future. We think of this as physical evidence
from the past; the “fossil record” of the past history of behavior.
The evidence st observed by individuals F t and G t at the beginning of t takes the form
of a past history ht ∈ H t of action profiles at played in each period 0, 1, . . . , t − 1, and by
convention s0 = ∅. Of course the observed evidence may or may not correspond to the history
that actually took place. The precision of st is parameterized by γ ∈ [0, 1]; when γ = 0 the
observed evidence st contains no information about the previous history, and when γ = 1 the
observed evidence st equals the true history of action profiles with probability one.
The exact parametric form of the distribution of observed evidence is unimportant, but
to fix ideas we assume it to be as follows. In each period, conditional on a particular action
profile at taking place at t, a signal pt is realized. The value of pt is equal to at with probability
(1 + 8γ)/9 (there are 9 possible action profiles) and is equal to any ât 6= at with probability
5

This is an immediate consequence of the “one-shot deviation principle.” See for instance the textbooks
by Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) or Osborne and Rubinstein (1994).
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(1 − γ)/9. The evidence s1 observed at the beginning of time t = 1 (and at the end of period
t = 0) is simply the signal p0 . The evidence observed at the beginning of t = 2 (and at the
end of period t = 1) is s2 = (p0 , p1 ), and so forth so that st = (p0 , . . . , pt−1 ). Note that we
take the per-period signals pt to be realized once and for all in each period t, in the sense
that, for instance, all individuals from the end of t = 0 onwards, observe the same realized
signal about what happened in period t = 0. Once the (imprecise) historical footprint is set,
it remains as given through time.
A private message (mtF or mtG ) also takes the form of a complete past history of action
pairs ht from 0 to t − 1.6 Individuals F t and G t first observe the evidence st , their private
messages if they are just entering the game, and then select actions. Both then observe the
action selected by the opposing individual at time t and subsequently st+1 . Once period t is
over, if they are to be replaced at t + 1, individuals F t and G t send private messages mt+1
F
and mt+1
to individuals F t+1 and G t+1 .
G
To summarize, each country is inhabited by a representative decision maker each period
who cares about his own and future countrymen’s payoffs. The demographic pattern of entry
and exit of individual decision makers within a country is arbitrary (subject to a bound on
lifetimes). Upon entry, an individual observes an imprecise footprint of what took place prior
to his entry. He also observes a private message concerning the past left by his predecessor.
While alive, he observes directly the other country’s decisions and how current action profiles
generate a footprint for the future. Finally, he sends a message to his successor just before
his own exit.
3.3.

Equilibrium

In every period individuals F t and G t choose actions as a function of what they have observed
during their lives. When they are about to be replaced they also choose messages to send to
individuals F t+1 and G t+1 . We refer to the first component of their behavior as the t-action
strategies, denoted αtF and αtG respectively, and to the second as the t-message strategies,
denoted µtF and µtG respectively. Taken together, the t-action strategy and the t-message
strategy of an individual make up the individual’s full t-strategy. The full t-strategies of
individuals F t and G t are denoted by f tF = (αtF , µtF ) and fGt = (αtG , µtG ) respectively. The
6

There is considerable latitude in the possible choices of message spaces. The ones considered here seem
the natural ones in many ways. All our results hold unchanged for arbitrary “sufficiently rich” message spaces.
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array that specifies the strategies of all individuals in both countries in all periods is denoted
by f ; a strategy profile.
The beliefs of individuals F t and G t about the previous history of actions and messages
may change during their lives, as the actions taken by the individual in the opposing country
and new evidence from the past is observed. We distinguish between beginning-of-period-t
beliefs and end-of-period-t beliefs. For individuals F t and G t , btF and btG respectively specify
both the beginning and end of period t beliefs. The array of beliefs of all individuals in all
periods is denoted b and is called a system of beliefs.
Our focus is social memory which is embodied in the individuals’ beliefs about the action
profiles played in the past. Of course, it is the beliefs at the beginning of every period
that determine the actions chosen by the current individuals. Therefore, it is convenient to
establish a piece of notation for the beginning-of-period-t beliefs of individuals F t and G t
about the past history of action profiles implied by btF and btG . These are denoted qtF and
qtG , and correspond to social memory in the two countries at the beginning of period t.7
Since our main results revolve on the possibility of systematically incorrect social memory, it is necessary to proceed with caution as to what is required of an equilibrium system
of beliefs. The most stringent conditions on equilibrium beliefs generally accepted in game
theory are those imposed by the notion of Sequential Equilibrium (Kreps and Wilson, 1982).
This requires the equilibrium beliefs to be recoverable as the limit of beliefs entirely determined by Bayes’ rule using a “fully mixed” perturbation of the equilibrium strategies. This
is more than a technical condition. Crucially, it requires all individuals to have a complete
and common theory of possible mistakes of all other individuals. Of course, in a Sequential
Equilibrium, the equilibrium strategies of all individuals must be (sequentially) rational given
the equilibrium beliefs.
From now on, we refer to (f , b) as an equilibrium of the model if and only if it constitutes
a Sequential Equilibrium of the dynastic game.
3.4.

Canonical Demographics

Consider a special case of the model in which there is full replacement every period. That
is, consider the case in which the demographics are that all individuals live one period, after
7

Of course, individuals who have been alive for some time have trivial beliefs about the history of action
profiles played during their lives since they directly observe them.

12

Social Memory and Evidence from the Past

which they are replaced. This simpler demographic structure is sufficient to generate all the
phenomena we are interested in: frequent all out wars, incorrect social memory and so on.
As it turns out, there is relatively little loss of generality in restricting attention to the
“canonical” demographics with full replacement every period. This is because, using a technique known at least since Ellison (1994), any equilibrium of the model with canonical demographics has a corresponding equilibrium in the model with L-bounded demographics with
the same “qualitative features.” In essence, the equilibrium in the L-bounded demographics
case is constructed as L interleaved “copies” of the equilibrium with canonical demographics.8
In the L-bounded demographics case, the strategies and beliefs of individuals alive in
periods 0, L, 2L, 3L and so on, “match” the strategies of the individuals alive in periods 0,
1, 2, 3 and so on in the model with full replacement every period. Matching here means that
when deciding how to play, the individuals alive at L will only consider information concerning
period 0, individuals alive at 2L will only consider information concerning periods 0 and L
and so on, forward without bound.9 The same construction is used to match the strategies
and beliefs of individuals alive in periods 1, L + 1, 2L + 1, 3L + 1 and so on with those of
the individuals alive in periods 0, 1, 2, 3 and so on in the model with full replacement every
period.
It is fairly straightforward to verify that if we are given an equilibrium of the model with
canonical demographics and discount factor δ, then the construction we have outlined yields
1

an equilibrium for the L-bounded demographics case for a discount factor of δ L .
Since the model with full replacement every period is both analytically and notationally
much simpler, from now on we restrict attention to this case.10
Before finally moving on, we remark that the equilibria of the model with L-bounded
demographics we have just sketched out may seem contrived. However, the point is that
there are equilibria in the case of L-bounded demographics with the properties we focus on
below. It is clear that they do not all have the form we have sketched out here; more “natural”
8

The same would be true if we considered the stochastic L-bounded demographics mentioned in footnote
4 above. The same technique would also allow us to use the model with canonical demographics to handle
demographics with overlapping generations of individuals within a dynasty. The details are well beyond the
scope of this paper.
9
Clearly, in the model with the L-bounded demographics, the messages sent must be constructed so that
the relevant information is passed along (unused) via the intervening individuals.
10
Hence, from now on our notation no longer has any redundancy. This was built in before precisely so as
to avoid having to change it at this point. See footnote 3 above.
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equilibria with the same qualitative properties exist in virtually all cases.
4.

Frequent All Out Wars

As we anticipated several times, it is possible that in equilibrium the two countries F and G
are caught in a perpetual cycle of frequent all out wars.
Proposition 1. Arbitrarily Frequent All Out Wars: Fix any positive integer N , and assume
that δ is sufficiently close to 1.
Then there exists a pair (f ∗ , b∗ ) in which the action profile (W, W ) is played N − 1 times
out of any N consecutive periods, which is an equilibrium of the model for any γ ∈ [0, 1).
We do not give a full formal proof of Proposition 1. This would inevitably be notationally
very intensive and hardly offer more clarity than the extended sketch we give here. The
equilibrium is depicted in a highly schematic way in the diagram below, and the argument
proceeds in several steps.
Step 1. We first argue that it is possible to construct an equilibrium of the model in which
the beliefs of every individual (beginning- and end-of-period) do not depend on the observed
evidence from the past.
To see that this is possible, consider a variation of the model with the physical evidence
from the past taken out entirely. Suppose that in this model we can construct an equilibrium
in which the beliefs of all individuals F t and G t are degenerate in the sense that they always
assign probability one to a particular past history of messages and actions, both on and off
the equilibrium path.
Now consider adding imperfectly informative evidence from the past (so that γ ∈ [0, 1))
to the model. Is the equilibrium we just described still viable? Clearly, we only need to
argue that the postulated beliefs can still obtain in equilibrium. (The strategies of all individuals must be sequentially rational given these beliefs, simply because they constitute an
equilibrium of the model without physical evidence from the past.) To see that this is the
case consider the same completely mixed strategies (as required for a Sequential Equilibrium)
that were used in the model without evidence, and construct completely mixed strategies in
the model with imperfectly informative evidence, using the same mixtures for every possible
realization of the physical evidence from the past. Since the beliefs were degenerate in the
equilibrium of the model without evidence from the past, and the per period signals have full
support, it is now easy to verify that using Bayes’ rule and shrinking the perturbations to
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zero yields the same beliefs in the model with an imperfect imperfectly informative evidence
from the past, regardless of its realization.
Step 2. In the construction outlined below, we work with message spaces that are smaller
than the sets of finite histories H t . This is without loss of generality since it is well known
that enlarging the message spaces can never shrink the set of equilibrium outcomes. The
reason for this is exactly the same as in many other cheap-talk models (see Farrell and Rabin
(1996) for a survey), and we do not expand further on it here.
Step 3. The strategies that sustain the outcome described in Proposition 1 can be specified
in terms of “phases” and how the time periods are partitioned.11 These are depicted in a
highly schematic way in the diagram below.

EquilibriumPhase
    
F→ W ... W C
G→ W . . . W C
|
{z
}
N Periods
F Deviates

G Deviates

H
F Punishment Phase
    
F→ W ... W C
G→ W . . . W D
|
{z
}
N Periods

H
G Deviates

J

F Deviates

I

G Punishment Phase
    
F→ W ... W D
G→ W . . . W C
|
{z
}
N Periods

Fix N as in the statement of Proposition 1. The first N − 1 periods are “war periods,”
and the N th period is a “peace period.” The next N − 1 periods are again war periods, and
these are again followed by a single peace period. This cycle of length N is repeated without
bound.12
11

Clearly, Proposition 1 identifies a class of equilibria, parameterized by N . Since they all share the same
structure we refer to them as a single equilibrium. Moreover, from now on, when we refer to the equilibrium
in Proposition 1, we mean the actual equilibrium described in this extensive sketch
12
Since the first period is t = 0, the first peace period is t = N − 1. All periods with t = `N − 1 with ` a
positive integer greater than 1 are also peace periods. All other periods are war periods.
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The action pair (W, W ) is chosen in every war period, regardless of which phase we are
in. On the other hand, the messages sent during war periods do change according to the
phase. So, in the description of phases that follow, we only describe which actions are taken
during the peace periods. During the war periods, provided that the all out war pair (W, W )
is chosen, both individuals simply repeat to their successors the message they receive from
their predecessors.
The two countries start off in the equilibrium phase, and remain in this phase unless a
deviation occurs. During the equilibrium phase the cooperative action pair (C, C) is chosen
in all peace periods. During the equilibrium phase both individuals F t and G t send message
m∗ to their successors provided that no deviations are observed at t.
If individual F t at any point (in a war or in a peace period, in any phase) deviates from
the prescriptions of the equilibrium, then the F punishment phase starts (or re-starts, as appropriate). Similarly, any deviation by any individual G t starts (or re-starts, as appropriate)
the G punishment phase. Double deviations are ignored. Each of these phases, if no subsequent deviations occur, lasts until the next T , with T “large,” peace periods have passed,
after which time the two countries return to the equilibrium phase. During the F punishment
phase the pair (C, D) is chosen in the peace periods, while during the G punishment phase the
pair (D, C) is chosen in the peace periods. During the F punishment phase, both individuals
F t and G t send message mF ,τ to their successors. The index τ = T, T − 1, . . . , 1 is used to
“count down” the remaining peace periods that must pass before the F punishment phase
ends.13 During the G punishment phase both individuals F t and G t send message mG,τ to
their successors, counting down in the same way.
Step 4. The individuals’ beliefs in equilibrium are independent of the evidence st . By Step
1 above, so long as the beliefs are degenerate this is a feature of equilibrium.
The individuals’ beliefs are “correct” in the equilibrium phase. In other words, upon
receiving m∗ both individuals F t and G t believe with probability one that the other has also
received message m∗ . Given these beliefs and the strategies of all future individuals in both
countries, given that δ is close to one, it is in the interest of both individuals not to deviate
from choosing W in a war period and C in a peace period. This is because any deviation will
cause the payoff to their country to decrease (from 2 to −1) in a large number (T ) of future
13

If t < T N − 1 the smaller values of the count-down index clearly have no meaning. The message sets
we have in mind are suitably smaller when t < T N − 1, so that only meaningful messages are included.
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peace periods.
Step 5. Now consider the F punishment phase. In this phase the beliefs of individual G t
are also “correct.” After receiving mF ,τ he believes with probability one that individual F t
has received the same message mF ,τ . It is not hard to see how this might be the case in a
Sequential Equilibrium and we do not pursue this further here (see footnote 14 for further
details). Given these beliefs an argument similar to the one we used for the equilibrium phase
is sufficient to see that no individual G t has an incentive to deviate during the F punishment
phase. A symmetric argument establishes that no individual F t has an incentive to deviate
during the G punishment phase.
Step 6. Consider an individual F t during the F punishment phase, or an individual G t
during the G punishment phase. We concentrate on the former case since the latter is completely symmetric. The first difficulty arises when we consider the beginning-of-period beliefs
of individual F t during the F punishment phase. Imagine that we are at the beginning of
such phase. The continuation equilibrium is bad for country F for many periods to come.
In fact its continuation payoff is sufficiently worse than the continuation payoff during the
equilibrium phase so as to deter deviations during the equilibrium phase.
Why should then individual F t go along and submit his country to the punishment prescribed by the equilibrium strategies? The answer is that, on receiving mF ,τ he incorrectly
believes that individual G t has received the message m∗ . But how can these beliefs be consistent, as required by equilibrium? The answer lies in the fact that upon receiving mF ,τ (or
any other off-the-equilibrium-path message) an individual must weigh several (infinitesimally
unlikely) possibilities. He could have received mF ,τ because play is in fact in the equilibrium
phase and individual F t−1 mistakenly sent message mF ,τ instead of m∗ . Alternatively, he
could have received mF ,τ because some previous individual in country F mistakenly took the
wrong action during the equilibrium phase. If the ratio of the second infinitesimal divided
by the first is zero, then individual F t will in fact have the beliefs we have described. He will
choose C, mistakenly thinking that individual G t will do the same.14
14

For instance, the fact that the beliefs we are postulating satisfy consistency as required for a Sequential
Equilibrium can be verified in the following way. The “trembles” used to construct the fully mixed strategies,
all expressed in terms of a common variable ε to be shrunk to zero are as follows. Whenever the equilibrium
prescribes an action different from D, D is actually played with probability ε2 . Whenever the equilibrium
t+3
prescribes an action different from W in period t, W is actually played with probability ε t+2 . Whenever the
t+3
equilibrium prescribes an action different from C in period t, C is actually played with probability ε t+2 . The
probability that any F t (resp G t ) sends any message mF ,τ (resp mG,τ ) when instead m∗ is prescribed by the
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Step 7. Finally, consider the end-of-period beliefs of an individual F t during the F punishment phase (the argument is symmetric for an individual G t during the G punishment phase).
At the beginning of period t, when he receives mF ,τ , he mistakenly expects individual G t to
choose C. But at the end of period t he discovers that the equilibrium is in the F punishment
phase since he observes that individual G t has in fact chosen D. However, whatever attempt
he makes at communicating to his successor F t+1 that play is in the F punishment phase
is doomed to fail. Given the strategies of all successive individuals, it is straightforward to
check that sending any message other than mF ,τ −1 (m∗ if τ = 1) will eventually cause the
equilibrium to lock into (D, D) in every future peace period. On the other hand sending
mF ,τ −1 (m∗ if τ = 1) will eventually return the countries to the equilibrium phase. This is
preferable from the point of view of F t because δ is close to 1 and in the equilibrium phase
the action profile (C, C) is chosen during every peace period.
The sketch of the proof of Proposition 1 is now complete. Before moving on, we proceed
with two remarks.
Remark 1. All Out Wars and Private Communication: The possibility of private communication between one generation of individuals and the next is critical for the possibility of
frequent all out wars. To see this, consider the dynastic game described above but with messages taken out entirely. Then, for every t, the long-run continuation payoffs in (2) cannot
be below −8 for either F or G. Therefore the all out war equilibrium of Proposition 1 is no
longer viable.
This follows from the fact that, with messages taken out the dynastic game is easily seen
to be equivalent to a repeated game with “imperfect public monitoring” (Fudenberg, Levine,
and Maskin, 1994) in which individuals are forbidden from using “private strategies.”15 Every
“perfect public equilibrium” in Fudenberg, Levine, and Maskin (1994) yields long-run payoffs
that cannot be below a player’s minmax payoff. Hence, in our case not below −8.
Remark 2. All Out Wars and Perfect Signals: Proposition 1 is false if the evidence st is
perfectly informative about the past history of action profiles.
In particular, if we set γ = 1, the long-run continuation payoffs in (2) cannot be below
−8 for either F or G, and for every t. Therefore the all out war equilibrium of Proposition 1
is no longer viable.
equilibrium strategies is ε. The probability of all other messages being sent instead of any other equilibrium
ones is ε4 .
15
The latter is because individuals F t and G t observe st at the beginning of t, but do not observe directly
the actions of any previous individuals, not even those of their own predecessors in the same country.
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To see why this is true we can proceed by induction in the following way. Individuals
F 0 and G 0 of course observe nothing about past play and do not receive any messages at
all. So, in equilibrium they forecast correctly the action chosen by the opposing individual.16
Then, during period 0, an action pair is played, and finally messages m1F and m1G are sent to
individuals F 1 and G 1 .
At the beginning of period 1, individuals F 1 and G 1 observe m1F and m1G and (since γ = 1)
the action pair that took place at 0. Now we can ask whether the beginning-of-period beliefs
of individual F 1 about what message individual G 1 has received (and hence about what he
will play) can possibly depend on m1F . The answer must be no. This is because individual F 1
observes exactly what individual G 0 observed when he selected the message m1G he sent to G 1 .
Hence, in equilibrium, individual F 1 can forecast exactly the message m1G simply on the basis
of what he observes about the past. Therefore his beginning-of-period beliefs about m1G do
not depend on m1F . A symmetric argument can be used to see that the beginning-of-period
beliefs of individual G 1 about m1F cannot depend on the message m1G he receives.
Proceeding by induction forward in time, this line of argument shows that the beginningof-period beliefs of any individuals F t and G t about what the opposing individual is about
to choose cannot depend on the messages mtF and mtG that they respectively receive.
From the insensitivity of beliefs to messages we have just shown we can then deduce that
when the evidence st is perfectly informative, the model must behave in the same way as the
model with private messages taken out entirely.17 This, as we saw above, implies that the
long-run continuation payoffs in (2) can never be below −8 for either country.
5.

Social Memory

In the equilibrium of Proposition 1, after some histories, social memory is incorrect in an
obvious intuitive sense (see Step 6 of the sketch of proof above). On the other hand, the
individuals have access to imperfectly informative evidence from the past that can be arbitrarily precise. Our focus here is on how this can occur in the first place, and to examine
16

The argument is more delicate but essentially the same if mixed strategies are allowed. In this case
of course each individual forecasts correctly the probabilities with which each action will be taken by the
opposing individual.
17
The argument here becomes a little more involved than our intuitive description suggests. This is because
upon receiving different messages, an individual may take different actions even though his beliefs are the
same. However, this difficulty can be circumvented noting that, since his beliefs are the same, he must be
indifferent between the different actions he takes.
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“how wrong” social memory can really be.
We remarked already that the beliefs of individuals F t and G t in the equilibrium in
Proposition 1 do not depend on the realization of the observed evidence st . This is neither
necessary nor sufficient to generate incorrect social memory. Social memory could be incorrect
even though beliefs are sensitive to the evidence from the past. And social memory could be
full and correct even though physical evidence from the past is disregarded entirely because
the messages from one generation to the next can in principle convey all available information
about the past history of action profiles.18
Intuitively, equilibrium beliefs can be independent of the evidence from the past as in
the equilibrium in Proposition 1 because the messages are sent after individuals F t and G t
observe the actual play in period t, and hence, in principle, can convey the true record of play.
Physical evidence, on the other hand, cannot possibly contain all information about what
happened in the past. It is then possible that the individuals place sufficiently more trust in
the messages than in the physical evidence and effectively ignore the latter. In a sense, it is
precisely because messages can in principle be truthful that they may override the evidence
entirely in the equilibrium beliefs. We view this as an appealing and realistic attribute of the
model. Witnesses of the Holocaust have more information than could possibly be conveyed
by the physical remains of Auschwitz.
In the equilibrium of Proposition 1 messages override the evidence from the past and
create social memory that is incorrect in a strong sense of the word. Our next task is to make
this precise.
5.1.

Statistical Testing

Because the individuals observe imperfect but informative evidence of the past history of
action profiles, there is a natural candidate to “measure” how incorrect social memory really
is. This way of proceeding seems particularly appealing if we want to argue that social
memory can be “maximally incorrect,” as turns out to be the case in the equilibrium in
Proposition 1.
In short, we can compare the individuals’ social memory at t — the beginning-of-period-t
18

It is in fact possible to construct “truthful” equilibria in which all information about the past history of
play is correctly conveyed from one set of individuals to the next. The perturbations that must be used to
construct the individuals beliefs in such equilibria are far from “natural.” In essence full truthfulness requires
that a single message mistake be infinitely less likely than an unbounded number of action mistakes combined.
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beliefs about previous action profiles, denoted by (qtF , qtG ) — with the inferences that an
outside observer (a “statistician”) — who knows nothing except for the realized evidence
st and its conditional distributions — would draw about the past history of play. Since
the evidence is informative about the past it could, in the limit as time goes by, make the
statistician “fully convinced” that certain statements are false (or true) about the past. If the
beliefs of one or more individuals were the reverse of what the statistician came to believe,
there would be good reason to say that social history is maximally incorrect in this case.
To flesh out this idea we need to be precise about what tests the statistician performs to
make inferences, and above all what it means that, in the limit, she becomes fully convinced
that some event did not or did occur.
The null hypothesis is a subset H0t of the set H t of histories of action profiles of length
t. For instance, this could be of the form “the action pair (C, C) has been taken n or more
times in the first t periods,” or “the action pair (D, D) never took place before t,” and so on.
Given the evidence st the statistician then asks whether the null hypothesis can be rejected
or not at a given significance level using a standard likelihood ratio test.19
Denote by Λ(st , H0t ) the actual value of the likelihood ratio for the null hypothesis H0t ,
given the evidence st . The test rejects the null H0t at the significance level α ∈ (0, 1) if
Λ(st , H0t ) is between zero and a cut-off level λ(α, H0t ) that depends on α and H0t .
Further, given a particular history of action profiles, say ht∗ , not contained in the null H0t
we can ask the following question. If ht∗ were in fact the true history, what is the probability
that the observed evidence is such that the likelihood ratio test will reject H0t at the α
confidence level?20 If this probability is η or more we say that, given ht∗ the null hypothesis
H0t is rejected at the α confidence level with probability at least η.
If, in the limit as t grows large, α can be made arbitrarily small and η arbitrarily large,21 we
can legitimately say that, given ht∗ the statistician would eventually become fully convinced
that the event “the true history is an element of H0t ” did not occur.
19

See Section A.1 in the Appendix for further details concerning the statistical procedures we refer to here.
Since these are completely standard, they are omitted from the main body of the paper for the sake of brevity.
See for instance the textbook by Silvey (1975).
20
Given ht∗ and α, this probability is known as the power of the test.
21
In other words if we fix any α > 0 and η < 1, then for t sufficiently large given ht∗ the null H0t is rejected
at the α confidence level with probability η. See Section A.1 in the Appendix for details.
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5.2.

Maximally Incorrect Social Memory

Grotesquely incorrect accounts of the past are regrettably easy to find.
“They have created a myth today that they call the massacre of Jews and they
consider it a principle above God, religions and the prophets”

—

Iranian

President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad on live state television in December 2005.22
Intuitively, social memory is maximally incorrect if for some null H0t we find that the
individuals believe H0t to be true with probability one, while the statistician will eventually
become fully convinced that H0t is in fact false. The individuals’ beliefs are that H0t is true
despite mounting evidence that it is false. A little extra notation is needed to proceed with
the actual claim.
Consider the equilibrium in Proposition 1. Fix any time t̄ and assume that up to and
including period t̄ − 1 no deviations from equilibrium occur. Consider then any deviation by
individual F t̄ at the action stage of period t̄, followed by a deviation by the same individual
at the message stage of period t̄, sending some mG,τ instead of mF ,T as prescribed.23
Now consider any period t > t̄, and assume no further deviations occur after t̄. Let ĥt
be the actual history of play of length t (following the deviations at t̄) prescribed by the
equilibrium of Proposition 1.
Proposition 2. Maximally Incorrect Social Memory: Fix any precision level γ ∈ (0, 1) for
the physical evidence of past history and consider the equilibrium of Proposition 1.
Let ĥt be as above, and for every t let Ĥ0t represent the null hypothesis “the action pair
(D, D) has never been chosen before t.”
Then, the equilibrium of Proposition 1 has the following features.
(i) Following ĥt , the social memory qtF and qtG of all individuals F t and G t is that the null
hypothesis Ĥ0t is true with probability one.
(ii) Following ĥt , the statistician observing the evidence will eventually (as t becomes
large) become fully convinced that Ĥ0t is in fact false.
Thus, after certain histories of play, social memory in both countries is maximally incorrect.
In spite of mounting evidence to the contrary, both individuals F t and G t at the beginning
22

As quoted in English translation by the B.B.C. (2005).
We could consider the symmetric deviations, by G t̄ at the action and message stages, reaching exactly
the same conclusions as in Proposition 2 below.
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of t believe that play is in the punishment phase for the opposing country, while (as is clear
from Step 7 of the sketch of the proof of Proposition 1) it is in fact locked into a perpetual
cycle of N − 1 periods in which all out war (W, W ) takes place followed by one period in
which (D, D) is chosen.
Maximally incorrect social memory does not require that the individuals be unanimous
in their mistaken beliefs. After certain histories of play (involving one deviation, by one
individual, at the action stage), social memory in one country alone (say F) is maximally
incorrect.24 Despite mounting evidence to the contrary, individual F t at the beginning of
period t believes that play is in the equilibrium phase while it is (and has been for a long
time) in fact in the F punishment phase. This takes place while social memory in country G
is correct; individual G t believes with probability one that play is in the F punishment phase.
5.3.

Evidence-Driven and Evidence-Determined Equilibria

We mentioned above that one of the critical ingredients that yields equilibrium beliefs driven
by messages rather than by evidence from the past is the fact that messages are sent after
individuals F t and G t observe the actual play in period t. Therefore they can, in principle,
convey more information than the evidence from the past, no matter how precise the latter
is provided it is not perfect: eyewitness’ accounts can override imperfect physical evidence.
To put this claim to the test, consider the following modification of the model. In each
period individuals F t and G t , after choosing their action at t, no longer observe the opponent’s
action at t while they still observe the imperfect public signal pt of the action pair taken at
t, as before. All other details of the model are unchanged. Refer to this modified model as
one of imperfect current monitoring.
In this modified dynastic game with imperfect current monitoring, social memory is determined by physical evidence alone in a well defined sense. We will show that in this case
social memory cannot be systematically wrong. In turn this implies that frequent all out war
equilibria like the one in Proposition 1 are no longer viable.
Our claim is surprising in the following sense. Going from the dynastic game we considered
before to the one with imperfect current monitoring we degrade the individuals’ information
about the current action profile. Yet, as a result we find that in equilibrium their assessment
24

Strictly speaking, we need δ to approach 1 and the length of the punishment phases to become unboundedly large to ensure that social memory is maximally incorrect in this case.
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of the history of play qualitatively improves in the sense that it cannot be systematically
wrong as before. We need to be more specific about what is meant by social memory being
determined by physical evidence alone.
Consider either the original dynastic game or the one with imperfect current monitoring.
Suppose now that all individuals ignore the messages they receive, and only base their beliefs
about the previous actions taken and messages sent by the opposing country on the evidence
st . In particular, the individuals’ beginning-of-period beliefs about what action the opposing
individual is going to choose must also depend only on the evidence st . Hence, in this case
the individuals’ beginning-of-period expected payoffs from taking any given action must also
depend only on st . We call an equilibrium in which the individuals’ beliefs have the property
we have just described an evidence-driven one.
As we anticipated, degrading the information that each individual has about the actions
in the current period has a dramatic effect on social memory. Our first characterization of
this effect is embodied in the next proposition.25
Proposition 3. Evidence-Driven Equilibria: Every pure strategy equilibrium under imperfect current monitoring is evidence-driven.
In an evidence-driven equilibrium expected continuation payoffs only depend on st . However, an individual’s choice of action may depend on the message he receives, provided his
expected continuation payoff does not change. Hence, to sharpen the characterization of the
extent to which the essential behavior of the model under imperfect current monitoring is
effectively determined by physical evidence only, we refer to a notion of equivalence among
equilibria.
Consider the dynastic game with either perfect or imperfect current monitoring. We
say that two equilibria are equivalent if and only if they yield the same beginning-of-period
and end-of-period expected payoffs, after any possible history of play, in terms of actions,
messages and observed evidence.
An equilibrium is evidence-determined if and only if the beliefs (about any part of the
previous history of actions and/or messages) and both the action and message strategies of
all individuals do not depend on the messages received. Our second characterization of the
effects of degraded information is the following.
25

Here, and in the remainder of the paper, we focus exclusively on pure strategy equilibria. The full-blown
analysis of the mixed strategy case is well beyond the scope of this paper.
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Proposition 4. Evidence-Determined Equilibria: Every pure strategy equilibrium under imperfect current monitoring is equivalent to an equilibrium that is evidence-determined.
Under imperfect current monitoring, physical evidence is the main engine behind equilibrium behavior. Crucially, this is reflected in the impossibility of social memory that is
systematically wrong. In fact there is a well defined sense in which under imperfect current monitoring social memory must be effectively correct after any history of action profiles,
whether deviations from equilibrium have occurred or not.
Building on the notation we established in Subsection 3.3 above, let qtF (st ) and qtG (st ) be
the social memory of the two countries at the beginning of t, with the dependence on st made
explicit. Recall that both qtF (st ) and qtG (st ) are probability distributions over the set H t of
previously chosen action profiles. Given any t < t − 1, it will be convenient to denote by
qtF (t, st ) and qtG (t, st ) the probability distributions over action profiles in periods t, . . . , t − 1
only implied by (the marginals of) qtF (st ) and qtG (st ).
Fix any time t and any history ht+ of actions and messages up to and including the action
stage of t − 1.26 As in Subsection 5.2, we then wish to consider histories that follow ht+ ,
assuming no further deviations after the action stage of t − 1. Given any t ≥ t, let et (ht+ , st )
be the actual equilibrium distribution over action profiles in periods t, . . . , t, following ht+ ,
given the evidence st .
In essence, in the dynastic game with imperfect current monitoring after any history, on
or off path, the two countries’ social memory can only differ from the actual equilibrium
distribution over action profiles in a payoff irrelevant way. Any equilibrium under imperfect
current monitoring must be equivalent to an evidence-determined equilibrium in the payoff
sense we have specified before. In any evidence-determined equilibrium social memory must
be correct on or off path.
Proposition 5. Correct Social Memory: Fix any precision level γ ∈ [0, 1] and any evidencedetermined equilibrium with either perfect or imperfect current monitoring. Consider any t
and any history ht+ as above.
Then, for every t > t and st it must be that qtF (t, st ) = qtG (t, st ) = etF (ht+ , st ) = etG (ht+ , st ).
In other words, in any evidence-determined equilibrium, the social memory of both countries
about previous action profiles chosen after t must be correct.
26

So far we have used the notation ht to indicate a history of action profiles from 0 to t − 1. We are now
using a subscript “+” to indicate a history of both action and message profiles.
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Clearly, Proposition 5 undoes the possibility of any discrepancy between the “findings”
of a statistician observer and social memory. In any evidence-determined equilibrium, social
memory correctly identifies the process that generates the actual data observed by the statistician (possibly aside from a finite number of periods t). As t becomes large, after any ht+ ,
any statistical test of social memory as a null hypothesis will be no more likely to reject it
than if the null were in fact true.
When we apply the definition of evidence-determined (or evidence-driven) to the model
with either perfect or imperfect current monitoring, all equilibria with frequent all out wars
are ruled out. Using the same logic as in Remark 1 it is straightforward to see that the
following is true.
Remark 3. Above Min-Max Payoffs: Fix any precision level γ ∈ [0, 1) and consider the
model with either perfect or imperfect current monitoring. Consider any evidence-determined
equilibrium. Then the long-run the payoff to both countries cannot be below −8. Therefore
the all out war equilibrium of Proposition 1 is no longer viable.
Thus, there is a sense in which degrading the information that individuals have about
actions currently taken makes both countries better off.
6.

Concluding Remarks

History is littered with instances of destructive conflicts. Some of them appear so utterly
incomprehensible that, in our view, existing theories have trouble explaining them.
A standard signalling model, for example, could possibly be used to justify conflict as
a rational response to a partially revealing strategy. The drawback of this explanation is
that it requires agents to assign large likelihood to objective states of the world in which the
conflict is desirable from at least one country’s point of view. Yet in some cases (World War
I being a case in point), the conflict appears so universally destructive that it would be hard
to imagine rational agents believing this.
Another justification could come from the theory of repeated games. In this scenario,
the repeated game model might explain a given conflict as one of many possible equilibrium
outcomes of the Folk Theorem. The problem is that even the Folk Theorem puts limits
on what can happen — only payoff outcomes above each player’s minmax can be possibly
sustained. Yet, the long-lasting devastation in some conflicts is so total that it seems hard
to conceive that such outcomes would lie above the minmax.
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In this paper, we wish to maintain the “optimistic hypotheticals” of these potential explanations. That is, we want to maintain the assumption of fully rational individuals who
have common knowledge about the destructive nature of the conflict. Among other things,
this rules out explanations that rely on exogenous states or preferences in which the conflict
is actually desirable.
Consequently, we study the role of social memory in creating and sustaining conflicts.
Social memory is embodied in a society’s vicarious beliefs about the past. These beliefs are
shaped by both intergenerational communication and the imperfect physical evidence from
the past. To formalize it entails a detailed model of the intergenerational communication
within dynastic societies.
We show that there exist equilibria in a canonical Game of Conflict in which “all out war”
occurs with arbitrarily high frequency. In these equilibria physical evidence is ignored and,
in fact, beliefs of one or both parties are maximally incorrect after certain events.
Significantly, these equilibria can occur despite the fact that there are no objective states
of the world in which the conflict is desirable from anyone’s point of view. These outcomes
could not be attained in a standard infinitely repeated game. Because messages can, in
principle, convey more information than any imperfectly informative physical evidence, there
are equilibria in which the current generation focuses only on the messages. Ironically, social
memory can be maximally incorrect precisely because it relies on sources that can be more
informative than hard evidence.
Two further issues bear mentioning here. First, a natural question concerns the issue of
social memory on path. Our use of equilibrium theory leaves little scope to address the issue.
On path, social memory cannot be systematically wrong. Yet, the phenomena concerning
social memory we have highlighted here take place off-path in the equilibrium of Proposition
1. Hence, it is important that the equilibrium we construct in Proposition 1 passes a critical
robustness test for Sequential Equilibrium. The strategies used in this equilibrium remain
sequentially rational even if we consider the trembles that generate the equilibrium beliefs
when they are arbitrarily small, but before they have completely shrunk to zero.27 Intuitively,
the robustness property we have just claimed tells us that the equilibrium on which we have
focused throughout the paper survives the possibility that play does in fact stray off the
27

In jargon, we are claiming that the equilibrium in Proposition 1 is “trembling-hand perfect in the agent
normal form” of the game.

27

Anderlini, Gerardi and Lagunoff

equilibrium path with positive (albeit arbitrarily small) probability. On the other hand,
systematically incorrect social memory may be possible on path for reasons other that what
we focus on in this paper. It might emerge, for example, from subjective beliefs that do not
come from a common prior. At this stage we leave this issue for future research.
Second, we have focused our attention entirely on “bad” equilibria with frequent all out
wars. The implication is that systematically wrong social memory is a bad thing. But there is
a flip-side to this which highlights the possible “good” consequences of wrong social memory.
Precisely because very bad payoffs can be sustained on path, these payoffs can be used as
“punishments” off it. We have examples that show that the cooperative outcome (C, C) can
be sustained in equilibrium for a lower δ in the dynastic game than in the standard repeated
game if γ is low. The construction is not as straightforward as it might look at first sight
since one cannot simply “plug in” — say — the equilibrium of Proposition 1 as a punishment
phase of another equilibrium in which (C, C) is sustained. The reason is that the equilibrium
of Proposition 1 is viable for a high δ in the first place.
Whether cooperation can in general be sustained more easily in the dynastic game is an
open question at this point. The issue of how the possibility of systematically inaccurate
social memory might lead to the emergence of better equilibria is clearly both interesting and
potentially important. This is another issue we leave for future research.
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Appendix
A.1.

The Likelihood Ratio Test

Purely for the sake of completeness, we make explicit the formal structure of the statistical testing procedures
used in the text. As we remarked already, these are completely standard (see for instance Silvey, 1975).
Remark A.1. Likelihood Ratio Test: For any fixed ht ∈ H t , let L(st , ht ) be the probability that the realized
evidence is st given that the actual history is ht . Given st , as ht varies L(st , ht ) is known as the likelihood
function of ht .
Fix a set H0t ⊂ H t of histories of length t and let
Λ(st , H0t ) =

maxht ∈H0t L(st , ht )
maxht ∈H t L(st , ht )

(A.1)

The quantity Λ(st , H0t ) is known as the likelihood ratio. For any given ht ∈ H t , Λ(st , H0t ) can be viewed
as the realization of a random variable (as st takes different random values).28 Given any E ⊆ R+ and any
ht , denote by Prht [Λ(st , H0t ) ∈ E] the probability that this random variable takes any value in E given that
ht is the true history of past action profiles.
Let α ∈ (0, 1) be given. It is common to say that the likelihood ratio test rejects the null hypothesis H0t at
the α significance level if Λ(st , H0t ) ≤ λ(α, H0t ), where λ(α, H0t ) = minht ∈H0t λ(α, ht , H0t ) and each λ(α, ht , H0t )
is defined as the maximum λ ≥ 0 such that

Prht Λ(st , H0t ) ∈ [0, λ] ≤ α
(A.2)
28

Throughout, we use the same notation for a random variable and its realizations since this will not cause any ambiguity.
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Definition A.1. Rejection at α Level With Probability η: Let a null hypothesis H0t be given. Let also a
particular history ht∗ be given.
We say that given ht∗ the null hypothesis H0t is rejected at the α confidence level with probability η if

Prht∗ Λ(st , H0t ) ∈ [0, λ(α, H0t )] ≥ η
(A.3)
A.2.

Proof of Proposition 2

To facilitate the exposition, we break the argument into 7 steps.
Step 1. From the strategies in Step 3 of the sketch of proof of Proposition 1, it is straightforward to check
that any history of action profiles ĥt as in the statement of the Proposition must be as follows.
Before t, the action pair (W, W ) is chosen in all war periods, and the pair (C, C) is chosen in all peace
periods. If t is a war period, then at t, individual F t chooses either C or D and individual G chooses W . If t
is a peace period, then at t, individual F t chooses either W or D, and individual G t chooses C. After t the
action pair (W, W ) is chosen in every war period, and the action pair (D, D) is chosen in every peace period.
Step 2. From the strategies in Step 3 of the sketch of proof of Proposition 1, it is straightforward to check
that at the beginning of each period, following any ĥt , individual F t receives message mG,T and individual
G t receives message mF ,T .
From Steps 4, 5 and 6 of the sketch of proof of Proposition 1, it is then immediate to conclude that at
the beginning of each period, following any ĥt , individual F t believes with probability one that play has been
in the equilibrium phase from period 0 to period t − 2, and that individual G t−1 has deviated in period t − 1
and hence started the G punishment phase. Symmetrically, at the beginning of each period, following any ĥt ,
G t believes with probability one that play has been in the equilibrium phase from period 0 to period t − 2,
and that individual F t−1 has deviated in period t − 1 and hence started the F punishment phase.
Clearly, at the beginning of each period, following any ĥt , both F t and G t believe with probability one
that the action pair (D, D) has never been played before. Thus, we have already shown (i) of the statement
of Proposition 2 to be true.
Step 3. Given the structure of the per-period signals we have described in the text, it is immediate that,
for any t, st and ht ∈ H t it must be that
st = arg max
L(st , ht )
t
t
h ∈H

(A.4)

and hence that for any t and any ht ∈ H t it must be that


1 + 8γ
9

t

= max
L(st , ht )
t
t
h ∈H

(A.5)

Step 4. Let Ĥ0t be the null consisting of the set of histories of action profiles length t such that aτ 6=
(D, D) for every τ = 0, . . . , t − 1. This is the null of the statement of Proposition 2.
For any st , let D(st ) the number of occurrences of the action profile (D, D) in the string of action profiles
that make up st . Given the structure of the per-period signals we have described in the text, it is immediate
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that, for any t, st and γ ∈ [0, 1) we have that


1 + 8γ
9

t−D(st ) 

1−γ
9

D(st )

= max L(st , ht )

(A.6)

ht ∈Ĥ0t

Step 5. From Steps 3 and 4 above, it is immediate that for any t, st and γ ∈ [0, 1)


1−γ
1 + 8γ

D(st )

= Λ(st , Ĥ0t ) =

maxht ∈Ĥ t L(st , ht )
0

maxht ∈H t L(st , ht )

(A.7)

Step 6. From (A.7), given the structure of the per-period signals we have described in the text, it is clear
that the probability distribution of Λ(st , Ĥ0t ) is the same under any true history ht ∈ Ĥ0t . In particular,
under Ĥ0t the probability that D(st ) equals any given value between 0 and t is given by a binomial with a
“success probability” equal to (1 − γ)/9. From the (weak) Law of Large Numbers we then know that, given
any sequence of histories of action profiles {ht ∈ Ĥ0t }∞
t=1 , we must have that



γ
1−γ
t
+
= 1
lim Prht D(s ) < t
t→∞
9
9N

(A.8)

As we have seen above, after t + 1, the histories ĥt that follow the deviations at t display the profile
(D, D) in every peace period, and hence every N periods. A completely analogous argument to the one
used to establish (A.8) can then be used to establish that, given any sequence of histories {ĥt }∞
t=1 as in the
statement of the Proposition, we must have that
lim Prĥt

t→∞




1−γ
γ
D(st ) > t
+
= 1
9
9N

(A.9)

Step 7. Let λ(α, Ĥ0t ) be a threshold rejection value as in Remark A.1. Then, from (A.7) and (A.8) it follows
that given any α ∈ (0, 1), we can find a t̃ such that

t ≥ t̃

λ(α, Ĥ0t ) >

⇒



1−γ
1 + 8γ

γ
t [ 1−γ
9 + 9N ]

(A.10)

Finally, using (A.7), (A.10) and (A.9) it is clear that, given any α ∈ (0, 1] and any η ∈ [0, 1), we can find
∗

a t such tat
t ≥ t∗

⇒

n
o
Prĥt Λ(st , Ĥ0t ) ∈ [0, λ(α, Ĥ0t )] ≥ η

(A.11)

and hence the proof is now complete.
A.3.

Proof of Proposition 3

We argue that the Proposition is true for the beliefs of the individuals in dynasty F concerning the actions
of individuals in dynasty G. The flip-side of the argument is, mutatis mutandis, identical hence omitted.
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Recall that the per-period signals defining st have full support. That is, for any t, any realized st has
positive probability given any possible true history of action profiles ht .
Given the equilibrium strategies of all individuals, and evidence st we can recurse forward to compute all
equilibrium actions and messages of all individuals up to an including period t − 1 in the obvious way. Fix st
= (p0 , . . . , pt−1 ). We begin with F 0 and G 0 , who of course observe nothing about the past. So their (pure)
action strategies determine the equilibrium action profile a0∗ . Given p0 and the (pure) equilibrium message
1∗
0
strategies we can now compute the equilibrium messages m1∗
F and mG . Given these messages and p we can

then use the (pure) equilibrium action strategies of individuals F 1 and G 1 to compute the equilibrium action
profile a1∗ . Recursing forward in this way, we can compute all equilibrium action and message profiles up to
t+1∗
and including at∗ and mt+1∗ = (mF
, mt+1∗
).
G

For a given any st , for every τ = 0, . . . , t let a(τ, st ) = (aF (τ, st ), aG (τ, st )) and m(τ, st ) = (mF (τ, st ),
mG (τ, st )) be the equilibrium action and message profiles aτ ∗ and mτ ∗ we have just computed, but with the
dependence on st made explicit, so that we can now vary it.
Consider individual F t at the beginning of t. The first case we consider is that he observes evidence
st and receives the corresponding equilibrium message mF (t, st ). It then follows from completely standard
arguments that his beliefs about the entire history of action and message profiles must assign probability
t t
one to the sequences {a(τ, st )}t−1
τ =0 and {m(τ, s )}τ =1 . At the end of period t, since we are in the imperfect

current monitoring case, it must also be the case that F t assigns probability one to individual G t having
played aG (t, st ) and having sent mG (t + 1, st ) to his successor G t+1 .
Now consider again individual F t at the beginning of t, but consider the complementary case in which
he observes evidence st and receives an off-path message mtF 6= mF (t, st ). Clearly, in this case he must
conclude that some deviation from equilibrium has occurred. In fact, since we are in the imperfect current
monitoring case, it must be that one or more individuals in dynasty F has deviated before t. Any message
mtF 6= mF (t, st ) could not possibly be observed otherwise.
Can the beginning-of-period equilibrium beliefs of F t assign positive probability to one or more individuals
in dynasty G having deviated before t? The answer must be “no.” A routine check reveals that in this case,
since the per-period signals have full support, F t must assign probability zero to this event after observing
st and mtF 6= mF (t, st ). Intuitively this is because a deviation by dynasty F is necessary to reach this
“information set,” and it is also the case that a single deviation (for instance at the message stage of t − 1) is
sufficient to reach it. So, ascribing a deviation to dynasty G after observing st and mtF 6= mF (t, st ) involves
more deviations than the minimum necessary to actually reach the given information set. By standard
arguments, this can never be the case in a Sequential Equilibrium. Hence, at the beginning of period t the
beliefs of F t about dynasty G must be as in the first case, in which F t observes st and the equilibrium mtF
= m(t, st ). At the end of period t, since we are in the imperfect current monitoring case, it must also be the
case that F t assigns probability one to individual G t having played aG (t, st ) and having sent mG (t + 1, st ) to
his successor G t+1 .
Comparing the first and second case we just considered, it is apparent that the beliefs of F t concerning
the history of actions and messages taken by dynasty G do not depend on mtF . Hence the proof is now
complete.
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Proof of Proposition 4

Consider the evidence-driven equilibrium described in detail in the proof of Proposition 3 (Section A.3).
Denote the strategy profile and system of beliefs constituting this equilibrium by f̂ and b̂ respectively, with
all their components also identified by a “hat” whenever necessary. We construct a new equilibrium (f̃ , b̃)
from the original one (with all components identified by “tilde” whenever necessary), and then argue that it
is evidence-determined and that it is equivalent to (f̂ , b̂).
We describe in detail how the construction proceeds for dynasty F. The construction for dynasty G is
symmetric and we omit the details.
To get f̃ from f̂ we set the behavior of all individuals after any off-path message to be the same as if they
had instead observed the equilibrium message. As a consequence, under f̃ the behavior of all individuals (at
the action and the message stage) does not depend on the message they receive.
To get b̃ from b̂ we set the beliefs of all individuals after any off-path message to be the same as if they
had instead observed the equilibrium message. As a consequence, under b̃ the beliefs of all individuals do
not depend on the message they receive.
Clearly, (f̃ , b̃) is evidence-determined. By construction neither the message or action strategies nor the
beliefs of any individual depend on the message he receives.
It remains to argue that (f̃ , b̃) is in fact an equilibrium and that it is equivalent to (f̂ , b̂). It is convenient
to argue the latter first. As before, we focus on dynasty F. The details for dynasty G are symmetric.
Since (f̂ , b̂) is in fact evidence-driven, it must be that going from (f̂ , b̂) to (f̃ , b̃) the beliefs of any
individual F t about the history of actions and messages for dynasty G are the same in the two equilibria.
Since following the receipt of an on-path message the strategies are the same across the two equilibria,
there is clearly nothing to prove in this case.
Consider then an on-path and an off-path message for the same st in the original equilibrium (f̂ , b̂). That
is consider F t and two information sets, an on-path one given by st and mtF = m̂F (t, st ), and the other
given by the same st and any off-path message mtF 6= m̂F (t, st ). At these two information sets, and at all
the ones following them after st+1 is realized, the beliefs of F t about dynasty G must also be the same. But
this implies that the continuation expected payoff of F t must be the same at these two information sets and
at those following them after st+1 is realized. Because of the way we constructed (f̃ , b̃) from (f̂ , b̂), this is
clearly enough to show that the two equilibria are equivalent.
To see that (f̃ , b̃) is in fact an equilibrium, we need to verify two things. The first is that the strategies
specified by f̃ are sequentially rational given b̃, and the second is that the beliefs b̃ are admissible for a
Sequential Equilibrium. Sequential rationality is a simple consequence of the fact that (f̂ , b̂) is an equilibrium
and of how we constructed (f̃ , b̃) from it. If sequential rationality failed at any information set in (f̃ , b̃),
then it would have to fail (on path) at a corresponding information set in (f̂ , b̂). Lastly, to check that the
beliefs b̃ have the requisite properties is a routine exercise. It is enough to assume that message deviations
are sufficiently “more likely” than deviations at the action stage. We omit the details.
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Proof of Proposition 5

Note that the statement is trivial if γ = 1. Hence, we proceed assuming that γ [0, 1). Let an evidencedetermined equilibrium (f , b) of either the original dynastic game of the one with imperfect current monitoring
be given. In either case the beginning of period equilibrium beliefs of all individuals can be characterized as
follows.
Consider individual F t at the beginning of period t, observing st = (p0 , p1 , . . . , pt−1 ). Since the actions of
all individuals do not depend on messages, and the per-period signals have full support, his beliefs about the
previous action profiles chosen can be computed recursively as follows. In period 0 of course no one observes
anything and so the (possibly mixed) action profile is directly given by the equilibrium action strategies of
individuals F 0 and G 0 . In period 1, we can compute the (possibly mixed) equilibrium action strategies of F 1
and G 1 , as a function of s1 = p0 , and so on forward in time. In other words, the beginning of period beliefs
of any individual F t or G t , given st = (p0 , p1 , . . . , pt−1 ) can be written as period-by-period functions of the
per-period signals pτ with τ = 0, . . . , pt−1 . So, we can write the social memory of country F at t, as qtF (st )
= (q(0, st ), q(1, st ), . . . , q(t − 1, st )), where each q(τ, st ) (with τ = 0, . . . , t − 1) is a probability distribution
over action profiles in period τ . Note that the function q does not have a country subscript or superscript
since it is the same for F and G. Hence qtG (st ) ≡ qtF (st ).
Now fix any t, ht+ , t > t and st . Let e(ht+ , st ) be as in the statement of the Proposition.
By assumption, in an evidence-determined equilibrium the actions of all individuals depend only on the
evidence they observe. Hence, conditional on a given st , given that the per-period signals have full support,
both individuals at time t will behave as if they were in equilibrium, even if the initial history ht is in fact
off-path.
It then follows immediately that we can write e(ht+ , st ) as period-by-period functions of the per-period
signals pτ with τ = 0, . . . , pt−1 . So, we can write as et (ht+ , st ) = (e(t + 1, st ), . . . , e(t − 1, st )), where each
e(τ, st ) (with τ = t + 1, . . . , t − 1) is a probability distribution over action profiles in period τ .
Since both the functions eτ (·, ·) and q τ (·, ·) are derived directly from the equilibrium strategies, they must
be the same. Hence the claim follows immediately.

